True tragedies often come with jaw-dropping surprises.
Today's hostage-taking situation in Manila tells of the fleeting condition of life, and how violence can escalate into murder and death of the innocents. And it will be a difficult mental work to understand how a bemedaled police officer lost his job, and ended up taking hostages in a bus, and died in the process.
Hostage-Taking in Manila
Today's hostage-taking situation in Manila tells of the fleeting condition of life, and how violence can escalate into murder and death of the innocents. And it will be a difficult mental work to understand how a bemedaled police officer lost his job, and ended up taking hostages in a bus, and died in the process.
Hostage-Taking in Manila
10:00 PM. The Hong Thai Travel bus (owned by Hong Thai Travel Services Ltd.) was about to leave Fort Santiago in Intramuros, Manila, where the tourists just visited when former Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza asked the driver that Mendoza be allowed to hitch a ride. He wore a full police uniform, carrying an M-16 rifle. The driver let Mendoza in, believing that the policeman was on duty.
In 2008, Mendoza was moved to the National Capital Region Office (NCRPPO) after a robbery-extortion case in Vito Cruz, Ermita, Manila was filed against him. That same year, he was accused with four other policemen of extorting money from a chef whom they accosted allegedly for parking violation and possession of illegal drugs. The chef was supposedly forced to eat shabu after failing to produce P200,000, but was later released when a friend allegedly gave P20,000. Mendoza got a 90-day preventive suspension (16 June to 14 September). However, on 16 February 2009, the PNP leadership ordered his dismissal from service, which resulted to the forfeiture of his retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from government service. (Click here for a background story on the case.)
He used to be an awardee of the "10 Most Outstanding Police," known for his "honesty" even on simple things as picking money on the street and returning it to its owner. His sibling (a Police Inspector, equivalent to a military lieutenant) and son (a Police Inspector) also worked in the police. He received a total of 17 police service medals and a commendation for excellent job performance. Among his medals are the Medalya ng Papuri, PNP Badge of Honor, Medalya ng Kasanayan, Medalya ng Kagalingan and Medalya ng Paglilingkod. Mendoza also was just months away from his mandatory retirement on 10 January 2011 at an age of 65.
Mendoza graduated from the Philippine College of Criminology, and entered law enforcement service in the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) in 1981.
10:15 AM. When the bus reached Jose Rizal Park, alongside Manila Bay, SI Mendoza took hostage inside bus 23 passengers (20 Hong Kong tourists and three Filipinos--a driver, a local tour guide, and a photographer) in a bid to be reinstated to service in the Philippine National Police (PNP). The bus was on its way to nearby Manila Ocean Park. Mendoza was armed with an M16 rifle when he hijacked the bus bearing plate number TUU-799.
When the bus reached near Quirino Grandstand at Rizal Park, Mendoza declared he was holding the people in the bus hostage.
12:00 NN. A PNP personnel loaded the bus with a gallon of gasoline in order to maintain the air-conditioning system as the heat rose. Six hostages were freed earlier, including three kids.
1:00 PM. Several Chinese Embassy officials arrived at the Quirino Grandstand to met with the negotiators.
1:23 PM. SI Mendoza asked for food and gasoline. The police brought in food for the hostages and prepared to provide another fuel to keep the air conditioning unit running as the heat outside reached 32 degrees Celsius.
1:27 PM. Another male hostage freed.
2:00 PM. SI Mendoza gave a demand deadline as he posted a message on the bus, "Big deal will start after 3 p.m. today."
2:40 PM. Tourist guide Rigor Cruz left the bus.
3:18 PM. SI Mendoza informed the police he wanted to talk to the media.
3:45 PM. Broadcast commentator Erwin Tulfo arrived at the Quirino Grandstand to help in negotiating with SI Mendoza for the release of his foreign hostages and a Filipino bus driver. Mendoza earlier posted a message on the bus stating, "Media now." Much earlier a message came out telling the police that "Big mistake to correct a big wrong decision." MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said in a The Philippine Star report that Mendoza was apparently distraught by the slow process of the Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconsideration. The PNP-Internal Affairs Service, he said, and the Manila Regional Trial Court had already dismissed the criminal cases against Mendoza.
4:25 PM (SunStar reported 4:00 PM). SI Mendoza released the ninth hostage, Danilo Medril (69).
5:16 PM. The bus was moved a few meters forward as negotiations went on.
5:50 PM. Superintendent Orlando Yebra, one of the negotiators, delivered the response letter from the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Isko Moreno personally handed the letter to SI Mendoza. SPO2 Gregorio Mendoza was allowed to escort the negotiator for undisclosed reason, after the police removed his firearm. However, instead of just accompanying the negotiator, SPO2 Mendoza spoke to his brother, telling SI Mendoza: "Tol, huwag ka muna pumayag hanggat 'di nila binabalik baril ko." Yebra told the SPO2 that he could already be considered a "conspirator" for uttering that statement to his brother.
5:55 PM. RMN DZXL anchors Rogas, Maderazo and Erwin Tulfo started interviewing SI Mendoza on the phone. Mendoza tells the interviewers that the hostages are watching TV.
6:00 PM. A single gunshot came from the bus, fired as a warning shot after SI Mendoza rejecting a letter from the Office of the Ombudsman, which rejected his demand for reinstatement to police service.
5:55 PM. RMN DZXL anchors Rogas, Maderazo and Erwin Tulfo started interviewing SI Mendoza on the phone. Mendoza tells the interviewers that the hostages are watching TV.
6:00 PM. A single gunshot came from the bus, fired as a warning shot after SI Mendoza rejecting a letter from the Office of the Ombudsman, which rejected his demand for reinstatement to police service.
6:20 PM. Another loud gunshot came from the bus. A few minutes later, SPO2 Mendoza came back with the negotiators from the bus after another apparent attempt at an agreement. Apparently SI Mendoza demanded that his brother be allowed to help in the negotiation.
6:56 PM. Receiving order from Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim who learned on what SPO2 said to his brother, the MPD personnel take custody of SPO2 Mendoza. [Earlier reports indicated that the PNP discovered the gun that the SPO2 brought with him to the hostage scene without informing the Manila police. Authorities said that SPO2 Mendoza was not tasked to help in the negotiation. Despite that he entered the police-set perimeter that excluded unauthorized personnel, without coordination with the police handling the case, and with a gun in him. The police decided to arrest him.] But when he saw his brother taken away by police, he threatened to kill the hostages. Tulfo went to the site to relay to the ground commander that Mendoza is planning to kill hostages if his brother will not be let go.
A young man (a Police Inspector), said to be a son of SI Mendoza, who had helped SPO2 Mendoza resist arrest earlier was hauled with the SPO2 away. Seeing this SI Mendoza, said the driver who later escaped the bus after jumping through the window said, killed most, if not all of the Chinese tourists held hostage.
7:18 PM. Seeing his brother taken away by the police, SI Mendoza told negotiator Yabut: "Ano ba ito, kalokohan? Bakit hindi pa sinosoli baril ng kapatid ko? Bibigyan ko kayo ng sampung mino para dalhin yun reinstatement order o sasample-an ko ang isa dito?" Then shots came from the bus. The police took it as "warning" shots. When Yebra returned to the command post, the officers said that SPO2 Mendoza will be charged.
7:23 PM. SI Mendoza started shooting that lasted for about 7 minutes. He is still on air interviewed in RMN DZXL. The bus driver escaped, telling that the hijacker killed all hostages. Then the line was off for 22 minutes.
7:32 PM. The police started its assault on the hostage-taker.
7:50 PM. After 22 minutes of interview cut, came back on the line and said that he had shot two hostages. He threatened to kill all hostages if the police will not stop running around the bus.
8:00 PM. The police tried to gain entrance through the front door but failed as two dead passengers were handcuffed to the door.
A young man (a Police Inspector), said to be a son of SI Mendoza, who had helped SPO2 Mendoza resist arrest earlier was hauled with the SPO2 away. Seeing this SI Mendoza, said the driver who later escaped the bus after jumping through the window said, killed most, if not all of the Chinese tourists held hostage.
7:18 PM. Seeing his brother taken away by the police, SI Mendoza told negotiator Yabut: "Ano ba ito, kalokohan? Bakit hindi pa sinosoli baril ng kapatid ko? Bibigyan ko kayo ng sampung mino para dalhin yun reinstatement order o sasample-an ko ang isa dito?" Then shots came from the bus. The police took it as "warning" shots. When Yebra returned to the command post, the officers said that SPO2 Mendoza will be charged.
7:23 PM. SI Mendoza started shooting that lasted for about 7 minutes. He is still on air interviewed in RMN DZXL. The bus driver escaped, telling that the hijacker killed all hostages. Then the line was off for 22 minutes.
7:32 PM. The police started its assault on the hostage-taker.
7:50 PM. After 22 minutes of interview cut, came back on the line and said that he had shot two hostages. He threatened to kill all hostages if the police will not stop running around the bus.
8:00 PM. The police tried to gain entrance through the front door but failed as two dead passengers were handcuffed to the door.
8:38 PM. Members of the PNP Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) entered the tourist bus at the rear side, and a firefight ensued a few minutes later. Despite the tear gas smoke filling the bus, a sniper found an opening at SI Mendoza during the firefight inside the bus, and managed to fire a bullet into his head, ending the hostage situation that took almost 11 hours. Two more hostages were found alive inside, which the responding paramedics helped out. Four hostages managed earlier to crawl at the back of the bus. Two hostages were reported dead. The police retrieved a 9-mm pistol and two hand grenades from Mendoza's dead body.
A very tragic day indeed. In just less than a day the Filipino nation witnessed a story of a bemedaled policeman lost his job and ended up losing his life, consumed by the present system of justice in the country. How desperate a man could be to risk his life in order to get the retirement service after serving the country for most of his life? In an unprecedented turn of event, how did it happen that a very cooperative hostagetaker who simply wanted to be reinstated to his police job and get his retirement benefits a few months later could lose his life and kill innocent people in the process?
Aftermath
Some countries decided to issue a travel ban against the Philippine. The list includes Hong Kong (issued 23 August 2010), Indonesia (issued Aug 24), Thailand (issued Aug 24), Nepal (issued Aug 24), Iran (issued Aug 24), Pakistan (issued Aug 24) and Russia (issued Aug 24).
Analyses
Failure of the police to use an elite AFP team to help gain control of the situation quickly. It became known that the AFP has offered and sent its elite special operations team specializing in hostage-taking and hostage rescue, the Light Reaction Company (LRC), to help in the situation, but the ground commander decided not to utilize them. The LRC has been well-trained and can work under abnormal conditions, including low visibility due to weather. Either the ground commander did not exactly know the true capability of its SWAT team to handle the situation, or was protecting its ego or wanted the police to claim credit in resolving the situation, so that he decided not to use LRC. The tentativeness and indecisiveness of the SWAT can be seen in the footage, an indication on their own doubts that they have the capability to resolve the situation without wasting the lives of the hostages.
Later in the Senate hearing, MPD Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Magtibay admitted that he was made to believe that the SWAT team were trained and could handle the situation. And that's the reason he did not use the LRC. It is also clear that Magtibay failed to really apprise himself on the real competency status of the SWAT before this situation happened. Had he seen the team in simulated action, he would have more accurate perspective on the team's capability to succeed in the task. In this area of command responsibility, he was remiss and negligent. Otherwise, he would have no excuse for sending an incompetent team to deal with the rescue when a military help was at hand.
The SWAT team forgot to bring gas masks. Lack of training in the part of SWAT becomes clear in their failure to bring gas masks in the situation that may force them to use tear gas on the hostage-taker in order to rescue the hostages. This alone could have hinted Magtibay on the ill-preparedness of the SWAT team for the situation.
Experts Reviews
Charles Shoebridge, a former counter-terrorism operator in the British Army and the Scotland Yard, noted in BBC News website 10 weaknesses in the police performance--lack of determination, lack of equipment, lost opportunity to disarm teh gunman, lost opportunity to shoot the gunman, satisfying the gunman's demands, televised proceedings, no element of surprise, little command and control of the public, using the gunman's brother to negotiate, and insufficient training.
Investigations
P-Noy misinformed actual decisions made on the ground. The President by police leadership on the change of tactic earlier relayed to him. The plan was for the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) to lead the final option of attack and rescue. But it turned out that the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team who performed the final option taking them hours to get through. No report came out who changed the plan on the ground. [Source: Thea Alberto: "Aquino admits he was misinformed on hostage updates," Yahoo! Southeast Asia 1 September 2010]
A Napolcom member stole the scene. A member of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) acted on as a talking head in behalf of the government, without authorization, by giving interviews on TV, which evidently brought the negotiation progress into an unfortunate stand-off, already shutting off the door to SI Mendoza. Aquino apparently order this person to shut up, but the Napolcom person simply ignored the Commander in Chief. [Source: Thea Alberto: "Aquino admits he was misinformed on hostage updates," Yahoo! Southeast Asia 1 September 2010]
Media broke the ongoing negotiation relationship. It becomes clear that the most serious flop that media did in this tragedy was becoming the cause for breaking down the communication between the hostage-takers and the negotiators. Negotiators could no longer reestablish contact with SI Mendoza because he was busy in a phone interview with an RMN radio broadcast anchor aired live. Worse, the radio anchor knew that SI Mendoza already threatened to kill some hostages if his brother would not be released. And the radio anchor did not call the police to inform them about this threat. [Source: David Dizon: "Manila's top cop airs side on hostage crisis," abs-cbnNEWS.com 03 September 2010]
SPO2 Mendoza was conspirator. It was under the recommendation of the chief negotiator that the hostage-taker's brother be removed from the scene after turning into a conspirator when SPO2 Mendoza, negotiator Yebra reported, told SI Mendoza not to accept the Ombudsman's offer. [Source: David Dizon: "Manila's top cop airs side on hostage crisis," abs-cbnNEWS.com 03 September 2010]
Conclusion
Ego and Incompetence Equal Disaster. When ego accompanies lack of training, disaster will be something to expect. The SWAT, despite obvious deficiency in training to handle the situation without losing the lives of hostages, still insisted they can handle it. Had they been honest with themselves, lives could have been saved. The military LRC had better training and fully equipped, and could have given much better results without losing hostage lives.
In the Name of a Live Interview. The most serious failure on the part of the media, particularly RMN Radio, in this tragedy was its role in breaking down the negotiation contact between the hostage-taker and the negotiator, at a very critical time in the mind of the hostage-taker. Media threw away social responsibility in the name of getting a scoop. It never occurred to the radio host that talking to the hostage-taker simply to get information would take precious time that the negotiator could have used to improve the situation. He also failed to tell the police that Mendoza already threatened to kill hostages if his brother would not be released.
President turned out wanting to talk to Mendoza to end the stalemate. DILG Undersecretary Rico Puno testified before the invetigation committee that P-Noy had indicated his desire to go to the hostage scene and face Mendoza "to find out what the dismissed officer wanted, but his advisers rejected such a move" in order to create a precedence to disgruntled employees.
A very tragic day indeed. In just less than a day the Filipino nation witnessed a story of a bemedaled policeman lost his job and ended up losing his life, consumed by the present system of justice in the country. How desperate a man could be to risk his life in order to get the retirement service after serving the country for most of his life? In an unprecedented turn of event, how did it happen that a very cooperative hostagetaker who simply wanted to be reinstated to his police job and get his retirement benefits a few months later could lose his life and kill innocent people in the process?
Aftermath
Some countries decided to issue a travel ban against the Philippine. The list includes Hong Kong (issued 23 August 2010), Indonesia (issued Aug 24), Thailand (issued Aug 24), Nepal (issued Aug 24), Iran (issued Aug 24), Pakistan (issued Aug 24) and Russia (issued Aug 24).
Analyses
Failure of the police to use an elite AFP team to help gain control of the situation quickly. It became known that the AFP has offered and sent its elite special operations team specializing in hostage-taking and hostage rescue, the Light Reaction Company (LRC), to help in the situation, but the ground commander decided not to utilize them. The LRC has been well-trained and can work under abnormal conditions, including low visibility due to weather. Either the ground commander did not exactly know the true capability of its SWAT team to handle the situation, or was protecting its ego or wanted the police to claim credit in resolving the situation, so that he decided not to use LRC. The tentativeness and indecisiveness of the SWAT can be seen in the footage, an indication on their own doubts that they have the capability to resolve the situation without wasting the lives of the hostages.
Later in the Senate hearing, MPD Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Magtibay admitted that he was made to believe that the SWAT team were trained and could handle the situation. And that's the reason he did not use the LRC. It is also clear that Magtibay failed to really apprise himself on the real competency status of the SWAT before this situation happened. Had he seen the team in simulated action, he would have more accurate perspective on the team's capability to succeed in the task. In this area of command responsibility, he was remiss and negligent. Otherwise, he would have no excuse for sending an incompetent team to deal with the rescue when a military help was at hand.
The SWAT team forgot to bring gas masks. Lack of training in the part of SWAT becomes clear in their failure to bring gas masks in the situation that may force them to use tear gas on the hostage-taker in order to rescue the hostages. This alone could have hinted Magtibay on the ill-preparedness of the SWAT team for the situation.
Experts Reviews
Charles Shoebridge, a former counter-terrorism operator in the British Army and the Scotland Yard, noted in BBC News website 10 weaknesses in the police performance--lack of determination, lack of equipment, lost opportunity to disarm teh gunman, lost opportunity to shoot the gunman, satisfying the gunman's demands, televised proceedings, no element of surprise, little command and control of the public, using the gunman's brother to negotiate, and insufficient training.
Investigations
P-Noy misinformed actual decisions made on the ground. The President by police leadership on the change of tactic earlier relayed to him. The plan was for the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) to lead the final option of attack and rescue. But it turned out that the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team who performed the final option taking them hours to get through. No report came out who changed the plan on the ground. [Source: Thea Alberto: "Aquino admits he was misinformed on hostage updates," Yahoo! Southeast Asia 1 September 2010]
A Napolcom member stole the scene. A member of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) acted on as a talking head in behalf of the government, without authorization, by giving interviews on TV, which evidently brought the negotiation progress into an unfortunate stand-off, already shutting off the door to SI Mendoza. Aquino apparently order this person to shut up, but the Napolcom person simply ignored the Commander in Chief. [Source: Thea Alberto: "Aquino admits he was misinformed on hostage updates," Yahoo! Southeast Asia 1 September 2010]
Media broke the ongoing negotiation relationship. It becomes clear that the most serious flop that media did in this tragedy was becoming the cause for breaking down the communication between the hostage-takers and the negotiators. Negotiators could no longer reestablish contact with SI Mendoza because he was busy in a phone interview with an RMN radio broadcast anchor aired live. Worse, the radio anchor knew that SI Mendoza already threatened to kill some hostages if his brother would not be released. And the radio anchor did not call the police to inform them about this threat. [Source: David Dizon: "Manila's top cop airs side on hostage crisis," abs-cbnNEWS.com 03 September 2010]
SPO2 Mendoza was conspirator. It was under the recommendation of the chief negotiator that the hostage-taker's brother be removed from the scene after turning into a conspirator when SPO2 Mendoza, negotiator Yebra reported, told SI Mendoza not to accept the Ombudsman's offer. [Source: David Dizon: "Manila's top cop airs side on hostage crisis," abs-cbnNEWS.com 03 September 2010]
Conclusion
Ego and Incompetence Equal Disaster. When ego accompanies lack of training, disaster will be something to expect. The SWAT, despite obvious deficiency in training to handle the situation without losing the lives of hostages, still insisted they can handle it. Had they been honest with themselves, lives could have been saved. The military LRC had better training and fully equipped, and could have given much better results without losing hostage lives.
In the Name of a Live Interview. The most serious failure on the part of the media, particularly RMN Radio, in this tragedy was its role in breaking down the negotiation contact between the hostage-taker and the negotiator, at a very critical time in the mind of the hostage-taker. Media threw away social responsibility in the name of getting a scoop. It never occurred to the radio host that talking to the hostage-taker simply to get information would take precious time that the negotiator could have used to improve the situation. He also failed to tell the police that Mendoza already threatened to kill hostages if his brother would not be released.
President turned out wanting to talk to Mendoza to end the stalemate. DILG Undersecretary Rico Puno testified before the invetigation committee that P-Noy had indicated his desire to go to the hostage scene and face Mendoza "to find out what the dismissed officer wanted, but his advisers rejected such a move" in order to create a precedence to disgruntled employees.
Reinstatement letter signed but undelivered. The idea of showing Mendoza a reinstatement letter came to the strategic discussion between the Executive and the police. NCR Police Officer Chief Supt. Leocadio Santiago apparently had a reinstatement letter drafted and signed. But the negotiators cannot get through to Mendoza because he had been talking to someone.
Sources
Jeannette Andrade, Marlon Ramos, DJ Yap: "Dismissed cop kills most of Chinese hostages--tourist bus driver." Philippine Daily Inquirer 23 August 2010 [link]
Tetch Torres, Cathy Yamsuan: "Hostage-taker killed as drama ends." Philippine Daily Inquirer 23 August 2010 [link]
JP, VR, Jill Beltran: "Hong Kong tourists held hostage; 9 freed," SunStar Network Exchange 23 August 2010 [link] This report provides much of the timeline mentioned here.
Leonardo Postrado: "Hostage-taker dismissed due to alleged extortion," Manila Bulletin 23 August 2010 [link]
Czarina Nicole Ong: "Mendoza an 'honest' policeman," Manila Bulletin 23 August 2010 [link]
Aaron Recuenco: "Hostage-taker a decorated cop with 17 medals," Manila Bulletin 23 August 2010 [link]
Gaiza Jarloc, Jill Beltran, Virgil Lopez, JVC: "Bus hostage crisis leaves 8 dead," Sun-Star Network Exchange 24 August 2010 [link]
VVP: "Magtibay: Hostage-taker's brother not part of negotiating team," GMANews.TV 26 August 2010 [link]
Czarina Nicole Ong: "No arrest order given, says Manila Mayor Lim," Manila Bulletin 26 August 2010 [link]
Gaiza Jarloc, Jill Beltran, Virgil Lopez, JVC: "Bus hostage crisis leaves 8 dead," Sun-Star Network Exchange 24 August 2010 [link]
VVP: "Magtibay: Hostage-taker's brother not part of negotiating team," GMANews.TV 26 August 2010 [link]
Czarina Nicole Ong: "No arrest order given, says Manila Mayor Lim," Manila Bulletin 26 August 2010 [link]
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